What might happen next in the East China Sea?  Japan and China are snapping at each other yet again.  Excerpt:

It’s been easy of late to get hyperbolic about the chance of conflict in East Asia. China appears to be the first serious military challenger America has had since the Soviet Union, and it is clearly beginning to throw its weight around in the waters of Asia. Especially raising tensions in the region is a passel of territorial disputes over islets that has pitted China against countries in southeast and northeast Asia and put Japan at odds with all its major neighbors. But the one key disagreement is between Japan and China in the East China Sea. There, an archipelago called the Senkaku Islands is claimed by Japan, Taiwan, and China. The islands sit near rich undersea oil and gas deposits, but, being situated just northeast of Taiwan, they also are in a crucial strategic location. They form the southernmost link in a chain of islands (including Okinawa and others) held by Japan that separate the East China Sea from the Pacific. The chain that ends with the Senkakus thus acts as a defensive barrier that conceivably could be used to prevent Chinese naval vessels from entering the wider Pacific.

Thus, Japan’s control of the islands presents a problem for Beijing. The history is murky, but Japanese control really didn’t start until the late 19th century. In 1945, the U.S. took over the Senkakus, and it returned them (along with Okinawa) to Tokyo’s administrative control in 1972. In recent years, however, basically since oil and gas were discovered nearby, China has reasserted a historical claim to the islands. Since the possibility of extractable energy reserves was discovered a decade ago, both Japan and China have tussled over whose islands (and resources) they really are. Half-hearted attempts at joint explorations for oil and gas have foundered due to mistrust and nationalistic intransigence.

 Then the situation exploded over the summer of 2012. Japan’s government, controlled by the now-opposition Democratic Party of Japan, decided to buy three of the islands from their private owner, in a bid to forestall Tokyo’s nationalistic governor from purchasing them for the metropolitan government. This set off massive protests across China and a several-week-long boycott of Japanese goods; major Japanese businesses operating in China temporarily closed their doors last autumn.

What was more dangerous, however, was a game of chicken that began in the waters off the Senkakus. Beijing dispatched private fishing boats and maritime patrol vessels on a near-daily basis to the islands, and Japan responded with its coast guard. The two countries have now faced off regularly in the waters around the Senkakus, sometimes with a dozen ships or more.

There’s a problem, of course.  Neither Japan nor China has the capacity to project power over across more than a few miles of blue water.  China can launch ballistic missiles, it’s true – missiles either tipped with nuclear warheads, a big, fat line even China is certainly unwilling to cross, or missiles tipped with conventional warheads – too little, too few.  China now has an aircraft carrier, it’s true.  Their carrier has no air wing to speak of, and it is the flower of 1980 Soviet technology; hardly a match for even one of the United States’ remaining nuclear carriers.

It’s an interesting situation.  There is a lot of history between the two countries; a lot of bad blood within (barely) living memory.  Japan is, no doubt, apprehensive about America’s willingness – and ability – to hold up treaty obligations to protect the Land of the Rising Sun.  China is gunning to be a dominant power in the Pacific.

Welcome to 1939, True Believers.  Things in this part of the world may grow interesting indeed.